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before the injunction issued. So it seems that the United States Supreme
Court does not narrowly interpret its decision in the Meadowmoor case.
While the standard of how much violence is necessary should be that
set out in the Meadowmoor case-namely, was it coercive- the fact
that the court refused to hear the Crosby case would seem to indicate
that there is no standard at all. The mere finding of violence associated
with the picketing is evidently enough to justify the issuance of an injunc-
tion to stop all further picketing.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter blandly told the defendant in the Meadow-
moor case that it might ask the Illinois court to modify or vacate the
injunction when the violence no longer had any intimidating effect. 6
This is some concession to the union in that case, but what about the
union in the Crosby case? There had been no findings that future
peaceful picketing would be coercive. Can the defendant go to court
and demand that the injunction be vacated on the ground that there
never was such a finding? This question is left unanswered by the
decisions thus far. R.C.C.
PLEADING AND PROCEDURE
APPEAL-NOTICE OF APPEAL-SUFFICIENCY AND AMEND-
MENT OF NOTICE
In an action in equity a decree was entered January 3, 194o. A
motion for new trial, filed the same day, was overruled February 9, the
entry fixing the amount of bond to be furnished by plaintiff-appellant
upon appeal on questions of law and fact. Within twenty days there-
after plaintiff-appellant gave "notice of her intention to Appeal to the
Court of Appeals from a final order made in the Court of Common
Pleas in the above entitled cause on the 9 th day of February, 1940.... "
The Court of Appeals on its own motion dismissed the appeal because
the notice of appeal was defective in that it specified the order over-
ruling the motion for new trial, which is not a final order, instead of
the prior appealable decree. An application for rehearing and a motion
for leave to amend the notice were denied on the ground that the
Court of Appeals has no authority to permit such amendment. This
decision was reaffirmed on a second application for rehearing. From
an entry dismissing the appeal and denying the application for rehear-
ing and for leave to amend, a motion to certify was granted. Held,
(By the Court) that, since the court of appeals has power to make
'I 85 L.Ed. .66, 6x Sup. Ct. 51o (194I).
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such amendment under Ohio Gen. Code, Sec. 12223-5, it was error
to refuse the amendment and dismiss the appeal. Judgment reversed
and cause remanded. Mosey v. Hiestand, 138 Ohio St. 249, 34 N.E.
(2d) 210 (94I)
Since "no step required to be taken subsequent to" the filing of a
"written notice of appeal . . . with the lower court, tribunal, officer
or commission," when the "appeal shall be deemed perfected," "shall
be deemed to be jurisdictional," a notice of appeal which has been
carefully drawn up is the condition precedent for the appellant to have
his case heard on the merits in the court of appeals.'
"The notice of appeal shall designate the order, judgment, or decree
appealed from and whether the appeal shall be on questions of law or
questions of law and fact. In said notice the party appealing shall be
designated the appellant, and the adverse party, the appellee, and the
style of the case shall be the same as in the court of origin. The failure
to designate the type of hearing upon appeal shall not be jurisdictional
and the notice of appeal may be amended by the appellate court in the
furtherance of justice for good cause shown."2
The Rules of the Supreme Court of Ohio have added requirements
to those of Ohio Gen. Code, Sec. 12223-5 "in all appeals to this Court."'
Aside from the admitted purpose of the New Appellate Procedure
Act,4 of which these sections are a part, "to minimize procedural dif-
ficulties and thereby facilitate the presentation of far more important
questions to courts of review,5 Ohio Gen. Code, Sec. 10214 enjoins
the court that the "provisions of part third and all proceedings under
it, [the Remedial Part, including procedure on appeal] shall be liberally
construed, in order to promote its object, and assist the parties in obtain-
'Ohio Gen. Code, Sec. 12223-4.
'Ohio Gen. Code, Sec. 12223-5-. Cf. Reibold v. Evans, 65 Ohio App. 123, 29 N.E.
(zd) 369 (194o) (appeal on both law and law and fact).
'Rules of the Supreme Court of Ohio (s94o) Rule 11, Sec. x. (A) "the appellant
shall, . . ., state in his notice of appeal, fled in the Court of Appeals, whether the appeal
is taken to this Court:
(a) in a case involving a constitutional question,
(b) in a case originating in the Court of Appeals,
(c) on condition that a motion to certify be allowed by this Court,
(d) in a felony case on condition that leave to appeal be granted by this
Court, or
(e) in a misdemeanor case on condition that a motion to certify be allowed
by this Court.
If the appellant claims a constitutional question and also intends to file a motion to
certify or motion for leave he shall mention both in his notice of appeal."
' ix6 Ohio Laws zo4 (1935), Ohio Gen. Code, Sec. 12223-1 to ZZZ3-49.
5See Cullen v. Schmit, 137 Ohio St. 479, 482, 3o N.E. (zd) 994, 996 (194o); cf.
Couk v. The Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. Ltd., 138 Ohio St. 210, 115, 33 N.E.
(2d) 9, 12 (194). "The legislative purpose throughout the act was obviously to liberalize
procedure upon appeals and to prevent technicalities from being fatal to substantive rights."
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ing justice. The rule of the common law, that statutes in derogation
thereof must be strictly construed has no application to such part,"..."'
(italics supplied.) Unfortunately many of the courts of appeals have
taken a strict view of the requirements of the notice of appeal and of
their authority and discretion to permit amendment thereof.
Sufficiency of Notice of Zppeal. At the outset of operation under
the Act a notice of appeal on questions of law and fact was held insuf-
ficient to perfect an appeal on questions of law alone.' in spite of
Sec. 12223-5 reading that the "failure to designate the type of hearing
upon appeal shall not be jurisdictional." But the Supreme Court held
that such notice fulfills the jurisdictional requirement and that an appeal
on questions of law and fact, where an appeal on questions of law only
can be perfected and where no bond is filed under Ohio Gen. Code,
Sec. 12223-6, will stand under Ohio Gen. Code, Sec. I2223-22,' for
appeal on questions of law alone.' A notice of appeal on questions of
law is not sufficient to perfect an appeal on questions of law and fact,
for Ohio Gen. Code, Sec. 12223-6 reads that "no appeal shall be
effective as an appeal upon questions of law and fact . . . unless . . .
bond be filed at the time the notice of appeal is required to be filed."'"
This rule would seem to apply even though the action is appealable on
questions of law and fact and a bond is properly filed." The courts
of appeal are not in accord as to whether a notice of appeal not directed
by date to any judgment or final order meets the statutory require-
" Couk v. The Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp., Ltd., 138 Ohio St. 110, 33 N.E.
(2d) 9 (94).
'Sommers v. DeRan, 53 Ohio App. 87, 4 N.E. (2d) 267 (1936); Is re Estate of
Arrasmith, 54 Ohio App. 391; 7 N.E. (zd) 8z6 (1936); Hall v. Hall, 55 Ohio App. 67,
S N.E. (zd) 5Sz (1936)5 Phillips v. Industrial Commission, 57 Ohio App. zo, ii N.E.
(2d) z65 (936)5 Stevely v. Stoll, S7 Ohio App. 401, 14 N.E. (zd) 419 (1937);
State v. Rickman, 23 Ohio L. Abs. 207 (936); Linton v. Williams, 23 Ohio L. Abs.
340 (1936); cf. Holmes v. Prudential Insurance Co., 30 Ohio L. Abs. 358 (1939).
'Ohio Gen. Code, Sec. 1223-zz. "(2) Whenever an appeal on questions of law
and fact is taken in a case in which it is determined by the appellate court that the
appellant is not permitted to retry the facts, the appeal shall not be dismissed, but it shall
tand for hearing on appeal on questions of law." Cf. Ohio Gen. Code, Sec. xi564.
'Loos v. The Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. Co., 134 Ohio St. 321; 16 N.E. (zd)
467 (193S)5 Bennett v. Bennett, 134 Ohio St. 330; 16 N.E. (2d) 474 (1938); Bettman
v. Northern Insurance Co., 134 Ohio St. 341, 16 N.E. (7d) 472 (938)i Kirk v.
Birktnbach, zz Ohio L. Abs. 569 (1937); Sackett v. McClure, z9 Ohio L. Abs. 56o
(x939)i Krause v. Henry, 30 Ohio L. Abs. 386 (1939). But cf. Cramer v. Cramer,
63 Ohio App. 358, z6 N.E. (2d) 78S (1938). See Stevens, Observations on the Appellate
Procedure Act (1939) zz Ohio Bar 491, 492-494.
"'Cf. Stevely v. Stoll, 57 Ohio App. 4ox; 14 N.E. (zd) 419 (1937); Laufer v.
City of Cincinnati, 57 Ohio App. 447, 14 N.E. (2d) 1023 (1937); Luchtenberg v.
Cooper Investment Co., 23 Ohio L. Abs. 389 (936)5 see fn. 7, supra.
' Cf. The Jacques Co. v. Squire, 135 Ohio St. 599; z N.E. (zd) 989 (939)
(pov.er to amend, but whether discretion abused in refusal not decided because no bill of
exceptions)i Couk v. The Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp., Ltd., 138 Ohio St. 11o,
115, 33 N.E. (2d) 9, 12 (1941).
ments,'8 even though Ohio Gen. Code, Sec. 12223-5 does not require
that the date of entry of such "order, judgment, or decree appealed
from" be specified in such notice. 8 But the Supreme Court has held
that a notice-"defendants hereby give notice of appeal"-is not
defective where it is incorporated in the journal entry overruling a
motion for new trial." The courts of appeal, however, are in agree-
ment that a notice specifying the date of the entry overruling a motion
for new trial as the entry from which appeal is taken, is defective
because it specifically mentions an order which is not a final order and
hence not appealable, 5 even where such notice further includes "such
other matters as are appealable in this cause."8 The Supreme Court
in this situation would probably likewise hold that such notice is
insufficient."7
Amendment of Notice of Appeal. But dismissing the appeal does
not follow from holding a notice of appeal defective, since a reviewing
court has authority to permit an amendment to a defective notice by
virtue of Ohio Gen. Code, Sec. I2223-5.-"The failure to designate
the type of hearing upon an appeal shall not be jurisdictional and the
notice of appeal may be amended by the appellate court in the furtherance
of justice for good cause shown." The provision giving power to amend
connected in the same sentence with the provision on designating the type
of hearing upon appeal prima facie leads to the conclusion that authority
exists to amend only where there is a "failure to designate the type
of hearing upon appeal."'" But such interpretation defeats justice
and does not carry out the legislative intent, especially when the
Supreme Court has held that the change of an appeal on questions
12 Compare State v. Rickman, 23 Ohio L. Abs. 207 (1936); Kline v. Green, z5
Ohio L. Abs. 240 (1937), with Routzahn v. Routzahn, z6 Ohio L. Abs. 667 (8938);
State v. Griffith, 27 Ohio L. Abs. 54. (1938). Cf. Bellman v. Dayton & Xenia Ry Co., 2z
Ohio L. Abs. x33 (8936) (petition in error held not sufficient because filed in wrong
court).
"Couk v. The Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp., Ltd., 838 Ohio St. 180, 33 N.E.
(2d) 9 (194..
" Capital Loan & Savings Co. v. Biery, 834. Ohio St. 333, 16 N.E. (2d) 450 (1938).
'Williams v. Braun, 6S Ohio App. 451, 30 N.E. (2d) 363 (894o); Mahaffey v.
Stine, 28 Ohio L. Abs. 368 (1938); Anderson v. Local Union, No. 483, 29 Ohio L. Abs.
364 (x939); Hauck v. Hauck, 29 Ohio L. Abs. S75 (1939); Covington Building & Loan
Ass'n. v. Yost, 31 Ohio L. Abs. 672 (1940); Davish v. Arn, 3z Ohio L. Abs. 646 (8940);
cf. Cultice v. DeMaro Realty Co., 29 Ohio L. Abs. 566 (1939).
"Unkle v. Unkle, 66 Ohio App. 364, 34 N.E. (2d) 71 (1940). To hold other-
wise "would require a reviewing court to examine every record, page by page and from
end to end, searching for final judgments which the appellant's counsel, either because they
do not exist or through lack of legal ability or lack of interest in his case, could not or
would not discover."
'Mosey v. Hiestand, 838 Ohio St. 249, 34 N.E. (zd) 210 (1941) (error to
refuse amendment shows amendment needed).
"sSee fn. iS, supra. Contra: Couk v. The Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp., Ltd.,
138 Ohio St. 110, 33 N.E. (zd) 9 (194-).
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of law and fact to questions of law only is mandatory and no amend-
ment is necessary."0 Such construction would make the authority to
amend meaningless, except in the law-to-law-and-fact case, if no such
power exists in other situations, as the courts of appeals have been
holding. But since August io, 1938, the Supreme Court has indicated
a broader view as to the amendment power of the court of appeals in
this field--"where, for some technical reason, the appeal would be
defective. In such case the reviewing court would have discretion to
permit an amendment for good cause shown." '2
Finally the Supreme Court in Couk v. The Ocean .dccident &
Guarantee Corp., Ltd.,2 held that, where the notice of appeal desig-
nated as the date of entry of the judgment from which the appeal was
taken one day before its actual entry, the court of appeals under Sec.
12223-5 has power to permit amendment of the notice to correct such
error. With authority settled, the question of the scope of discretion
of the court to allow amendment "in the furtherance of justice for
good cause shown" still remained. Whether the Supreme Court would
reverse a refusal to allow an amendment was not decided, because in
the Couk case the Court merely affirmed the action of the Court of
Appeals permitting an amendment. Although the Couk case was certi-
fied as being in conflict with Cultice v. DeMaro Realty Co.,22 which did
refuse the amendment, the certified case being affirmed, Bettman, J.
expressly distinguished the cases where "a notice of appeal referring,
by date or otherwise, to an order which was not a final order" had
been heretofore held neither sufficient nor amendable.23 Schultz v.
Killmer,2' decided along with the Mosey case, reversed on the authority
of the Couk case a refusal to allow an amendment of a notice of appeal
designating as the date of the judgment from which the appeal was
taken a date when no entry had been made, long prior even to the
jury verdict. Here the error was admittedly a clerical one, solely the
fault of counsel for appellant. Consequently "for good cause shown"
does not require that the mistake in the notice be excusable or unavoid-
able. Since the notice of appeal in the Mosey case designated the entry
overruling a motion for new trial as that order from which appeal was
being perfected, the Supreme Court, reversing here also on the authority
"S ee fn. 9, supra.
!Sce Loos v. The Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. Co., 134 Ohio St. 321, 327, x6 N.E.
(zd) 467, 470 (193 8 )i cf. Bennett v. Bennett, 3. Ohio St. 330, x6 N.E. (2d) 474
(1938) (amendment "not prerequisite" to change appeal from law and fact to law);
The Jacques Co. v. Squire, 135 Ohio St. S99, 2i N.E. (zd) 989 (1939) (Section 12223-5
"authorizes the Court of Appeals to permit an amendment").
I138 Ohio St. 110, 33 N.E. (zd) 9 (x94) •
2 29 Ohio L. Abs. 566 (x939). This is the "judgment of the Court of Appeals
Clark county 'on questions of procedure pertaining to notice of appeal'" referred to.
'See fn. xS, supra
24 138 Ohio St. 249, 34 N.E. (2d) 210 (194).
462 LAW JOURNAL- JUNE, 1941
of the Couk case, was not only holding that the Court of Appeals had
abused its discretion, but was expressly overruling the line of cases
represented by Mahaffey v. Stine. 5 The standard by which to deter-
mine whether discretion has or has not been abused in permitting or
refusing amendment of the notice is whether the appellee has been so
misled by a defective notice of appeal that he is "prejudiced or taken
by surprise." "The purpose of such a notice is to apprise the opposite
party of the taking of an appeal." 26 "If this is done beyond danger
of reasonable misunderstanding, the purpose of the notice of appeal is
accomplished."2 " Any court of appeals refusing an amendment of the
notice when such standard is satisfied is expressing the art of juris-
prudence "in the refinements of procedural technique required," penal-
izing clients for mistakes of their counsel,2" and making a mockery of
justice. It would be far better for the courts of appeals not to alienate
the public from the bench and bar by deciding, on procedural technicali-
ties, instead of on their merits wherever possible2" until after many
miscarriages of justice the Supreme Court, finally presented with the
question, reversing adopts the view more liberal and closer "to absolute
justice." The record of the Supreme Court, especially in procedural
matters, would indicate that the courts of appeals would probably be
much more often affirmed if they took such views."0  R. J. W.
'See fn. 15, supra. The fact that the entry overruling the motion for new trial in
the Mosey case fixed the amount of bond for appeal on questions of law and fact should
have rendered such entry a sufficient notice of appeal without any other notice under Capi-
tal Loan & Savings Co. v. Biery, 134 Ohio St. 333, 16 N.E. (zd) 450 (a938).
'See Capital Loan & Savings Co. v. Biery, 134. Ohio St. 333, 339, a6 N.E. (zd)
450, 453 (1938) (only one judgment and one court from which and to which appeal could
be taken). But cf. Malone v. Industrial Commission, 66 Ohio App. gag N.E. (2d) (19.).
The function of the assignment of error should not be incorporated into the standard by
which to test the sufficiency and amendability of the notice of appeal. See Rules of Prac-
tice of the Courts of Appeals of Ohio (1936) Rule VII.
'Couk v. The Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp., Ltd., 138 Ohio St. i5o, 116,
33 N.E. (ad) 9, 12 (1941) (since but one judgment appellee could not have been misled).
This is the rule in other jurisdictions. Woods v. Kern County Mutual Building and
Loan Association, 34 Cal. App. (ad) 468, 93 P. (zd) 837 (939)i Bedke v. Bedke,
57 Idaho 443, 65 P. (zd) 1029 (1937)5 Nelson v. The City of Osawatomie, 148 Kan.
118, 79 P- (2d) 857 (1938); Thiess v. Rapaport, 57 Nev. 434, 66 P. (ad) 1000 (1937);
Rosenberg v. General Realty Service, Inc., 259 N.Y. IZ3, 181 N.E. 71 (1932);
Obenberger v. Obenberger, aoo Wis. 318, 228 N.W. 492 (193o). Rule 73 (b) of the
New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure providing:-"NoxcE oF APPEAL. The notice of
appeal shall specify the parties taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment or part
thereof appealed from5 and shall name the court to which the appeal is taken . .. "-has
been liberally treated by the Circuit Courts of Appeals. Cf. Crump v. Hill, Xo4 F.
(zd) 36, (C.C.A 5th, 1939); Martin v. Clarke, xoS F. (ad) 685 (C.C.A. 7 th, 1939)-
See 3 MOORE'S, FEDERAL PRACTICE (1938) 3394-95-
'See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, p. 18 in the Mosey case.
'Title Guarantee and Trust Company v. Lester, az6 Cal. 372, 14 P- (2d) 297
(1932).
'Judgments of the courts of appeals were reversed and the causes remanded in the
following cases:-Loos v. The Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. Co., 134 Ohio St. 321, I6 N.E.
(ad) 467 (938)5 Bennett v. Bennett, 134 Ohio St. 330, 16 N.E. (ad) 474 (1938);
